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Abstract
We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where
the agent’s knowledge about the performance measure is ambigu-
ous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the prin-
cipal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a
subset of all informative performance measures. That is, the In-
formativeness Principle does not hold in our model. These results
stand in stark contrast to the ones of the orthodox theory, but are
empirically of high relevance.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82, M12, M52.
Keywords: Ambiguity Aversion, Principal-Agent Model, Moral
Hazard, Informativeness Principle.
1. INTRODUCTION
In principal-agent models with moral hazard, the principal motivates the
agent to spend eﬀort via a performance-dependent wage scheme. Stan-
dard theory predicts (i) that the wage scheme highly depends on perfor-
mance and (ii) that the principal contracts on all performance measures
which are informative about the agent’s eﬀort. However, in reality, wage
schemes sometimes do not depend on performance or the dependence is
rather weak1 and the Informativeness Principle “seems to be violated in
many occupations”(Prendergast 1999, p. 21).
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1See Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Holmstr¨ om
and Milgrom (1991), and Prendergast (1999).WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 2
The reason for this discrepancy between theory and empirics may be
due to the following assumption: orthodox models implicitly suppose that
the agent knows precisely the statistical properties of the performance
measure. This is a strong assumption because “real-life choices rarely
come with precise probabilities” (Post et al. 2008, p. 39).2 In this
article we relax this assumption. We show that considering ambiguity
and ambiguity aversion in an otherwise conventional model can bring
theory in line with empirics.
The famous Ellsberg (1961) paradox predicts that individuals are
averse to missing information regarding probabilities. Ellsberg suggests
the following experiment. Urn A contains 50 black balls and 50 red ones.
Urn B contains 100 balls, each of which is either red or black, but the
proportion is unknown. One ball will be drawn from each urn. Empir-
ically, subjects are indiﬀerent between betting on “the ball drawn from
urn A is black”and“... red”. This also holds for urn B. However, subjects
prefer bets in which urn A is involved over bets in which B is involved.
This cannot hold under the Bayesian-rational expectations hypothesis.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) propose the following solution. “In case
of urn B, the subject has too little information to form a prior. Hence,
(s)he considers a set of priors as possible.” (p. 142; italics provided).3
We consider a setting where the agent has little information about the
stochastic component of the performance measure. Therefore, the agent’s
beliefs about the distribution of the shock on the performance measure
are not represented by a single probability distribution, but instead by a
set of probability distributions. We use Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989)
ambiguity aversion concept in which the individual evaluates an act by
the probability distribution that yields the lowest expected utility. In
our moral hazard framework, this means that the agent is, loosely speak-
ing, pessimistic about the realization of the shock whenever rewards are
stochastic, which is necessary in order to create incentives. Because the
principal has to ensure participation of the agent, she has to compensate
him for his pessimism. This implies that her costs of providing incen-
tives are relatively high and that her expected payoﬀ is relatively low
(compared to the orthodox model which neither considers ambiguity nor
ambiguity aversion). Because the costs of implementing even small in-
centives can be non-negligible, the principal may optimally provide no
incentives at all, that is, set a ﬁxed wage. In a benchmark case, consid-
2Similarly, Oﬀerman et al. (2009, p. 1463) state that“[f]or most uncertain events,
no objective probabilities of occurrence are known.” See also Ghirardato (1994, p. 3).
3In contrast, a Bayesian expected utility maximizer nonetheless has a single prob-
ability measure and is neutral to ambiguity; see Savage’s (1954) axiomatization and
the nontechnical discussion of Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2008).WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 3
ered in Section 3.3, the principal always provides weaker incentives with
ambiguity than without. Interestingly, in the more general case, the prin-
cipal may also provide stronger incentives. This can happen when the
marginal implementation costs are lower in some range due to ambiguity.
Considering multiple performance measures, we show that it can be
optimal for the principal not to contract on an informative but ambigu-
ous performance measure and instead provide incentives solely via other
measures. The reason is that, with ambiguity, the inclusion of a mea-
sure into a wage scheme causes costs which are not negligible even when
the wage depends on the measure only to a small extent. Hence, the
Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model.
Related Literature.— Mukerji (1998) shows that ambiguity might
endogenously lead to the incompleteness of contracts. He considers a
hold-up problem and incompleteness in his setting means that the con-
tract does not include any instruction for some possible events.
In contrast to the ﬁnance literature,4 the ambiguity concept is rarely
used in principal-agent theory. There are a few exceptions. Mukerji
(2003) inquires into the impact of ambiguity in procurement contracts
under cost uncertainty. His main result is that the optimal contract sets
no ﬁnancial incentives at all to induce exertion of cost-reducing eﬀort
when the ambiguity is suﬃciently high.5 In contrast to our model, only
a binary shock realization is considered, the agent is assumed to be risk
neutral, and only the case with one performance measure is analyzed.
Because of the assumption of risk neutrality, he cannot study the classical
tradeoﬀ of the principal-agent literature between providing incentives
and sharing risks. Additionally, one cannot discuss the Informativeness
Principle when the agent is risk neutral or there is only one performance
measure; see the arguments in Section 4. Therefore, we are able to yield
many results which cannot be analyzed in Mukerji’s (2003) model. We
also yield a result which is in contrast to Mukerji (2003). While in his
model ambiguity always leads to a lower powered incentive scheme (given
that the agent is more averse to ambiguity than the principal), we show
that ambiguity may also cause a higher powered scheme.
Kellner (2009) shows in a multiple-agent setting that ambiguity and
ambiguity aversion can lead to the superiority of tournaments over wage
schemes that only depend on each agent’s own output. Ghirardato (1994)
and Karni (2009) also belong to this literature, but have diﬀerent foci
than we have: while Ghirardato’s main topic is the quality of information,
4See, for example, Dow and Werlang (1992) or Epstein and Wang (1994).
5Lang (2007) studies a model which is similar to Mukerji’s (2003), where the agent
has to perform two tasks and only the performance of one task can be rewarded.WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 4
Karni develops axiomatic foundations of ambiguity aversion.
In Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991), the total value of the organization
cannot be used as a performance measure and the agent has to exert mul-
tiple tasks. They show that it can be optimal to set no monetary incen-
tives when only the performance of some tasks can be rewarded (p. 33).
We show that also in a setting where the agent exerts a single task it can
be optimal not to set incentives. When there are many performance mea-
sures, the multiple-task model predicts—like the orthodox model with
one task and without ambiguity—that every performance measure which
is informative should be included in a compensation scheme, given that
positive eﬀorts should be implemented.6 This is in contrast to our model
where it can be optimal to contract only on a subset of all informative
performance measures.
Our model can also be interpreted as a principal-agent setting with
noncommon priors; see Section 5.3. In Fang and Moscarini (2005), the
principal and the agents have diﬀerent priors about the agent’s abilities.
They investigate the implications of worker overconﬁdence and do not
consider ambiguity.7
In the next section, we present the model. We analyze it in Section 3.
In Section 4, we consider the case with multiple performance measures.
In Section 5, we discuss our model and its results. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
The Moral Hazard Problem.— We use the normal distribution, linear
contract, exponential utility structure popularized by Holmstr¨ om and
Milgrom (1987) in the speciﬁcation of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005,
Ch. 4.2). The principal (she) wants to induce the agent (he) to invest
eﬀort. Unfortunately, eﬀort is not contractible. Only performance q =
a + ε is contractible, where a ∈ R+ is agent’s eﬀort and ε a random
factor/shock. The principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the agent.
It is assumed that the contract can only specify a wage scheme which is
linear in performance: w = t + sq, where t is the ﬁx component and s
is the variable component, where s can be interpreted as the incentive
power provided by the contract. When the agent rejects the contract,
he receives a monetary payoﬀ of ¯ w and the principal receives ¯ π, where
6See Feltham and Xie (1994), which show that“[t]he value of an additional measure
is zero if, and only if, the existing measures constitute a suﬃcient statistic for the
additional measure with respect to the manager’s action.” (p. 430).
7For other principal-agent models where parties have diﬀerent priors, see Hvide
(2002), de la Rosa (2007), and Santos-Pinto (2008).WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 5
¯ w + ¯ π < 0.8 When the agent accepts, he chooses eﬀort which causes
private costs of ψ(a) = 1
2ca2, where c > 0 is a cost parameter.9 Then
the shock realizes and the wage payment is made in accordance with
the contract. The principal is risk neutral and his payoﬀ is q − w. The
agent’s utility is u( ) = −e−η[w−ψ(a)], where η > 0 is the coeﬃcient of
absolute risk aversion. We later clarify which assumptions are crucial for
our results and which are not.
Ambiguity.— Let there be a ﬁnite number of probability distribu-
tions of the shock that are plausible for the agent, given his knowledge.
The agent is ambiguity averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989). The principal is ambiguity neutral and has, for simplicity, the
same knowledge as the agent. Therefore, and in contrast to the agent, the
principal is able to aggregate all plausible distributions and thereby form
a unique prior. We assume that the principal puts a positive (though
possibly arbitrary small) weight on each plausible distribution and that
her aggregated distribution is normal. We normalize the units in which
the shock is measured such that the principal’s aggregated distribution
is ε ∼ N(0,σ2).10 We further assume that the plausible distributions are
stochastically independent. In Section 5.1, we discuss some aspects of
the described structure.
Given stochastic independence, and because the principal’s aggre-
gated distribution is normal, Cram´ er’s (1936) Theorem implies that the
plausible probability distributions are normal, too. The set of plausi-
ble distributions is called G = {1,...,g,...,G}, with G ≥ 1. The generic
element g is a distribution which is characterized by its mean µg and vari-
ance σ2
g. We assume that for all plausible distributions σ2
g > 0; otherwise
we cannot aggregate all plausible distributions to ε ∼ N(0,σ2).
D e f i n i t i o n 1: When G contains only one element (G = 1), there
is no ambiguity. When it contains more elements (G > 1), there is
ambiguity.
So when only one distribution is plausible for the agent, there is no
ambiguity. When there are multiple plausible distributions, there is am-
biguity.
8We add this assumption to make sure that the principal hires the agent.
9Quadratic costs yield closed-form solutions but are not crucial for our results.
10This facilitates comparisons to the orthodox model where it is assumed that there
is no ambiguity and all parties evaluate the wage scheme according to ε ∼ N(0,σ2).WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 6
3. ANALYSIS
3.1. THE AGENT’S PROBLEM
The agent has two problems. First, evaluate the principal’s oﬀer (and
decide whether or not to accept it). Second, to choose eﬀort when he
accepted.
Being ambiguity averse in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
the agent assigns to each possible eﬀort and contract the plausible distri-
bution which leads to the lowest expected utility. That is, the agent eval-
uates a wage scheme according to the, loosely speaking, most pessimistic
plausible distribution. Which plausible distribution is most pessimistic
depends on the wage scheme.
Calculations similar to the ones in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)
yield that the certainty equivalent of the agent is











Observe that the agent’s two problems are separable in the sense that
the agent’s selection of the optimal eﬀort level is independent from the
evaluation of the contract. This simpliﬁes the analysis greatly.
When the agent accepts the principal’s oﬀer, he selects the level of
eﬀort which maximizes his expected utility or equivalently his certainty
equivalent. From the ﬁrst-order condition of (1) and because the second-




s/c for s ≥ 0,
0 otherwise. (2)
The agent evaluates the scheme (s,t) according to the plausible dis-
tribution ˇ g which minimizes his expected payoﬀ:
ˇ g ∈ argming∈G ˆ w( )|g . (3)
It is possible that ˇ g is not unique. As will become clear below, this causes
no problems. Finally note that the agent accepts the principal’s oﬀer if
and only if ˆ w(a∗)|ˇ g ≥ ¯ w.
3.2. THE PRINCIPAL’S PROBLEM
The principal evaluates the wage scheme according to the distribution
ε ∼ N(0,σ2). She solves the following program:
max
s,t E[q − w] subject to (4)WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 7
(i) the incentive constraint that the agent chooses the eﬀort level which
maximizes his expected payoﬀ: a∗ ∈ argmaxa ˆ w(a)|ˇ g, and
(ii) the participation constraint which guarantees that the agent ac-
cepts the principal’s oﬀer: ˆ w(a∗)|ˇ g ≥ ¯ w,
(iii) the constraint that the agent evaluates the scheme according to the
plausible distribution ˇ g, which minimizes ˆ w( )|g.
We now seek to simplify the maximization problem. First, from Sec-
tion 3.1 we know that we can replace the incentive constraint by (2).
Second, in the optimum the participation constraint holds with equality;
otherwise the principal can decrease t so that her payoﬀ increases. Hence,
the principal’s problem (4) can be rewritten as
max
s a + sµˇ g − ηs
2σ
2
ˇ g/2 − a
2c/2 − ¯ w subject to (5)
(i) (2) and
(ii) ˇ g ∈ argming∈G ˆ w( )|g.
We ﬁrst consider the relaxed problem and then continue with the full
problem.
Principal’s Relaxed Problem.— Suppose that the agent evaluates
a contract according to the plausible distribution g. Additionally, we












− ¯ w. (6)
The interpretation is simple: the ﬁrst part is the eﬀort induced by the
contract; the terms −(sµg−ηs2σ2
g/2) are the combined risk and ambiguity
premium which can be decomposed into a risk premium ηs2σ2/2 and an
ambiguity premium −sµg + ηs2(σ2
g − σ2)/2; the term s2
2c represents the
equilibrium eﬀort costs; and ¯ w is the monetary equivalent of the agent’s
outside option.








The principal’s expected payoﬀ is derived by evaluating (6) with s = s∗|g.
Without Ambiguity.— When there is no ambiguity, G contains only
one element. Then the only plausible distribution g must be characterized
by µg = 0 and σ2






1 + ηcσ2, (8)
which are always positive. Without ambiguity the solution of the relaxed
problem is the solution of the principal’s full problem. Observe that whenWEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 8
there is no ambiguity the agent’s ambiguity aversion does not matter and
we get the results of the orthodox model. The same is true when there is
ambiguity but the agent is ambiguity neutral. Therefore, ambiguity only
matters in connection with ambiguity aversion and vice versa.
Returning to the Principal’s Full Problem.— The next lemma says
that there is always a plausible distribution which has a non-negative
mean.
L e m m a 1: There is a g ∈ G for which µg ≥ 0.
Next we prove that the principal does not set a contract where the
wage is decreasing in performance.
L e m m a 2: The principal never sets negative incentives: s∗ ≮ 0.
A rough intuition is that setting negative incentives is never optimal
because also no incentives (s = 0) implement the same eﬀort a = 0, but
the principal’s costs are lower than with negative incentives because the
agent is fully insured against random factors.
Because in the optimum s ≥ 0, we can replace the constraint (2)
by s ≥ 0 and substitute a = s/c into the principal’s objective function.
Moreover, we know from before that the agent’s two problems, namely
choosing eﬀort and the distribution with which the scheme is evaluated,












− ¯ w subject to (9)
(i) s ≥ 0 and




We next seek to answer the question whether or not the principal
optimally provides positive incentives.
P ro p o s i t i o n 1: The principal contracts on the performance mea-
sure if and only if µg > −1/c, where g ∈ argming∈G µg.
So when there is a plausible distribution with a suﬃciently low mean
the principal speciﬁes a ﬁxed wage scheme (s∗ = 0) and sets no incen-
tives at all. Intuitively, due to ambiguity the marginal costs of providing
incentives are not negligible even for small incentives whenever µg < 0.
Formally, lims→0 d(ambiguity premium)/ds = −µg. At the same time
the marginal beneﬁt of setting small incentives (via inducing a higherWEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 9
eﬀort) is 1/c. Hence, whenever it is suﬃciently costly to provide even
small incentives, the principal sets no incentives at all.11
The result that the principal may optimally set a ﬁxed wage scheme is
in stark contrast to the results of the orthodox model. In a model without
ambiguity/ambiguity aversion, there is no ambiguity premium. Then,
the principal’s marginal costs of providing small incentives are negligible.
Therefore the principal always sets incentives, see (8). More technically,
when the agent is risk averse but ambiguity neutral, the agent is ﬁrst-
order neutral towards stochastic payments: lims→0 d(risk premium)/ds =
0.
Consider next the case where 1+cµg > 0. Then the principal will set
positive incentives and the ﬁrst constraint of the principal’s problem (9)
















− ¯ w. (10)
The formula can be interpreted as eﬀort minus implementation costs
(which in turn consists of the risk and the ambiguity premium, the eﬀort
costs, and the agent’s outside option). Figure 1 shows how one constructs
the principal’s implementation costs, given two plausible distributions.
A dotted line depicts the implementation costs when the agent uses a
particular distribution to evaluate the wage scheme. Due to ambiguity
aversion ` a la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the distribution according to
which the agent evaluates the wage scheme is always the one which leads
to the higher implementation costs. The bold line shows the principal’s
actual implementation costs and is constructed out of the segments of
both dotted lines. In the right diagram of Figure 1, we added a straight
line s/c. This is the agent’s eﬀort, or equivalently, the principal’s ben-
eﬁt from setting the incentives s. One can easily solve for the optimal
incentives s∗.
This simple example already clariﬁes that the implementation costs
are always convex. This implies that the optimal contract is unique.
Observe that the optimum can easily be characterized for a concrete set
of plausible distributions. This is, however, not the case for a general
set. One of the diﬃculties is that one may get corner solutions; see the
right diagram of Figure 1. Technically, s∗ does not necessarily coincide
with s∗|ˇ g from (7). In Section 3.3, we consider a special set of plausible
distributions which allows us to yield the solution explicitly.
11When no incentives are set, zero eﬀort is implemented. It may be more plausible
to assume that the agent wants to spend some eﬀort even when no incentives are set.
This is indeed the case if the eﬀort cost function satisﬁes ψ′(a) ≤ 0 for a ∈ [0,¯ a], with
¯ a > 0, see Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991, pp. 33-34).WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 10
s s s

















Figure 1: The costs of setting incentives (left, middle) and the optimal
incentives (right).
From Figure 1 or (10) it is apparent that µˇ g and σ2
ˇ g are weakly increas-
ing in the incentives s. For low-powered incentives, the agent evaluates
the scheme according to the plausible distribution with the lowest mean.
For higher-powered incentives, the agent uses a distribution with a higher
mean and variance. Intuitively, because of the agent’s risk aversion, high-
powered incentive schemes are especially harmful for the agent when the
variance of the shock on the performance measure is high. This is not
the case for lower-powered schemes because then the agent does not care
much about variations.
Can we compare the implementation costs which the principal faces
when the agent is ambiguity averse versus when he is not?
P ro p o s i t i o n 2: The principal has higher costs of implementing
any eﬀort a > 0 with ambiguity than without. She is strictly worse oﬀ
with ambiguity than without.
Intuitively, with ambiguity the principal has to compensate the agent
not only for his risk premium, but also for his ambiguity premium. This
increases the principal’s cost of implementing any level of eﬀort, and
hence also the principal’s cost when the optimal eﬀort is implemented.
Observe that a higher degree of risk aversion η leads to steeper imple-
mentation costs. Hence, the principal sets weakly lower incentives.
Does the principal provide weaker incentives with ambiguity than
without? In Section 3.3, we show that this is indeed the case when the
plausible distributions can be ordered in a grid; see Proposition 3. This
is, however, not true in general. We next provide an example where
the principal optimally sets stronger incentives due to ambiguity. The
key insight is that stronger incentives can be optimal when the marginal
implementation costs are lower for some range with ambiguity than with-
out.WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 11
An Example where Ambiguity Cause Higher-Powered Incentives.—




no ambiguity = 1/2,
see (8).
Consider next the case where there is ambiguity and there are two
plausible distributions (G = 2). The plausible distribution 1 has the
following properties: µ1 = −1/6 and σ2
1 = 1/2. The principal puts a
weight of p1 → 0 on the plausible distribution 1 and a weight p2 =
1 − p2 on the plausible distribution 2. Because the principal aggregates
all plausible distributions to ε ∼ N(0,σ2), we have µ2 ≈ 0, σ2
2 ≈ 1.
From (1) and (3) we get that the agent evaluates the wage scheme
according to the plausible distribution 1 when 0 ≤ s . 2/3. From (7)
we get that the principal optimally sets s∗|1 = 10/18, given that the
agent evaluates the wage scheme according to plausible distribution 1.
Because s∗|1 = 10/18 is below 2/3, the agent indeed uses the plausible
distribution 1. Taking as given that the agent evaluates the wage scheme
according to the plausible distribution 2, the principal optimally sets
s∗|2 which is approximately 1/2. But for s ≈ 1/2 the agent evaluates
the wage scheme according to the plausible distribution 1 and not 2. It
is straightforward to show that setting incentives so that the agent is
indiﬀerent between both plausible distributions is worse for the principal





which is above the incentives set without ambiguity.
The intuition is that the plausible distribution 1 has a low mean µ1
which causes the absolute implementation costs to be higher with am-
biguity than without (or with the plausible distribution 2, at least for
incentives up to s ≈ 2/3). But due to the low variance σ2
1, the marginal
implementation costs for incentives of s ≈ 1/2 are lower with ambigu-
ity than without. Hence, the principal optimally sets higher-powered
incentives with ambiguity than without.
3.3. PLAUSIBLE DISTRIBUTIONS IN A GRID
Suppose that there are M means and N variances which are plausible
for the agent. All combinations are plausible, too, resulting in M × N
plausible distributions which can be ordered in a grid. See Figure 2
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Figure 2: A 4×3 example of plausible distributions.




assign the numbers such that µm < µm+1 and σ2
n < σ2
n+1.
The following deﬁnition is useful.
D e f i n i t i o n 2: There is more ambiguity when µ1 decreases and
σ2
N does not decrease, or µ1 does not increase and σ2
N increases.
The motivation is as follows: when the agent misses more information
regarding the probabilities, the set of plausible distributions (µ and σ2)
is more dispersed which results into a decrease of µ1 and an increase of
σ2
N.12 Observe that for any contract which positively depends on the
performance measure, an ambiguity-averse agent is worse oﬀ when there
is more ambiguity in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.
L e m m a 3: Suppose M × N > 1. Then µ1 ≤ 0 and σ2
N > σ2. The
ﬁrst inequality is strict for M ≥ 2.
In words, the plausible distribution with the lowest mean has a mean
which is smaller or equal to the mean of the principal’s aggregated dis-
tribution, and the plausible distribution with the highest variance has a
variance which is greater than the variance of the principal’s aggregated
distribution.13
Because the plausible distributions can be ordered in a grid it is very
simple to determine the distribution according to which the agent eval-
uates a contract. When the principal sets a contract with positive in-
centives s > 0, then the agent’s lowest expected utility is yielded when
12One can think of the wider dispersion as a mean preserving spread of µ and σ2.
13It is easy to show that Lemma 3 is also true for the case in which the realizations
of the plausible distributions are correlated (and the plausible distributions are still
normal). There is one exception: when the correlation is 1 and N = 1, we have
σ2 = σ2
N.WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 13
the variance is maximal and the mean minimal. So the agent evaluates
a wage scheme with s > 0 according to the plausible distribution [1,N].
When the principal provides a contract without incentives s = 0 and
all plausible distributions yield the same expected utility. Without loss
of generality we can hence assume that also in this case the agent uses
the plausible distribution [1,N]. Because of Lemma 2, we do not have to
consider cases with negative incentives s < 0.












− ¯ w s.t. s ≥ 0. (11)






N for 1 + cµ1 > 0,
0 otherwise.
(12)
Proposition 1 also applies here: the principal sets no incentives if and
only if µ1 ≤ −1/c. From Lemma 3 we know that µ1 ≤ 0 and σ2
N > σ2.
Hence, we have an additional result.
P ro p o s i t i o n 3: Suppose that the plausible distributions can be
ordered in a grid. With ambiguity the incentives set by the principal are
weaker than without ambiguity.
The intuition is that when the plausible distributions can be ordered
in a grid, the marginal implementation costs are always higher with am-
biguity than without.







N) − ¯ w for 1 + cµ1 > 0,
− ¯ w otherwise.
(13)
So the principal is worse oﬀ with ambiguity than without; see also Propo-
sition 2.
An advantage when the plausible distributions are ordered in a grid
is that one can yield closed-form solutions and therefore directly gets the
comparative statics.
Comparative Statics.— First, more ambiguity leads to the provision
of weaker incentives: ds∗/dµ1 > 0 and ds∗/dσ2
N < 0. Intuitively, more
ambiguity increases the marginal costs of providing incentives. Hence,
the principal sets weaker incentives.WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 14
Second, more ambiguity leads to a lower expected payoﬀ for the prin-
cipal: dE[q −w]∗/dµ1 ≥ 0 and dE[q −w]∗/dσ2
N ≤ 0, where for s∗ > 0 the
inequalities are strict. The logic is simple: the principal can set the same
incentives with little ambiguity than with a lot of ambiguity. Because
more ambiguity leads to higher costs for the principal in order to provide
a certain level of incentives (see arguments before), the principal must
be better oﬀ with little ambiguity.
Third, in the orthodox model as well as in the model with ambiguity
a higher degree of risk aversion η (at least weakly) decreases the optimal
incentives and the principal’s payoﬀ.
4. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: VIOLATION OF THE INFOR-
MATIVENESS PRINCIPLE
We start with two remarks. First, when no eﬀort is implemented, there
is no need to use any performance measure in the wage scheme.14 Hence,
it is only useful to interpret the Informativeness Principle in the way that
whenever some eﬀort is implemented, any measure of performance that
reveals information about eﬀort is included in the contract. Trivially,
when there is just one measure, this measure must be used; otherwise
no incentives are set. We therefore now consider the interesting case
where there are multiple measures of performance. Second, the agent’s
risk aversion is crucial to discuss the Informativeness Principle. When
the agent is risk neutral, the ﬁrst-best is implementable even with one
(nonambiguous) performance measure. Then the principal does not care
whether there is another performance measure or not.
Suppose there are two performance measures Y and Z with realiza-
tions y and z, respectively. Similar to the case with one performance
measure, we assume that
y = a + εY,z = a + εZ,
and that the principal’s expected payoﬀ is a−E[w]. We initially assume
that εY and εZ are uncorrelated. Moreover, we assume that the agent
only feels ambiguity with respect to the performance measure Z and he
is again ambiguity averse. The contract takes the form w = t+sYy+sZz.
The principal evaluates the wage scheme according to εY ∼ N(0,σ2
Y) and
εZ ∼ N(0,σ2
Z). The agent uses εY ∼ N(0,σ2
Y) to evaluate a wage scheme.
On the measure Z we impose the same assumptions as in Section 3.3.
That is, we consider the case where the plausible distributions can be
14With linear schemes no eﬀort can be implemented when the wage does not depend,
or negatively depends, on the performance measure(s).WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 15













where we assign the numbers such that µZ,m < µZ,m+1 and σ2
Z,n < σ2
Z,n+1.
The next proposition states that it is not always optimal for the prin-
cipal to include both performance measures into the contract.16
P ro p o s i t i o n 4: The principal always contracts on the perfor-







In the orthodox model (without ambiguity/ambiguity aversion), it is
always optimal to use both measures (see Holmstr¨ om 1979). The intu-
ition is as follows. Suppose the optimal contract depends only on the
measure Y . By making the contract slightly dependent on the measure
Z the agent’s risk premium does not increase marginally(keeping the ef-
fort level ﬁx), because the agent is locally risk neutral. However, the
agent’s incentives are improved. This allows the principal to make the
contract less dependent on Y (so that the agent chooses the same eﬀort
level), which decreases the agent’s risk premium and thereby also the
principal’s costs. Hence, the optimal contract uses Y and Z.
This arguments do not hold with ambiguity. From Section 3.2 we
know that the costs of making a contract even slightly dependent on an
ambiguous performance measure are non-negligible whenever the agent
is averse to ambiguity. Therefore, when there is a lot of ambiguity (i.e.,
when µZ,1 is low) the principal does not use the measure Z, even though
Z reveals information. This ﬁnding is valuable because“the Informative-
ness Principle, i.e., that all factors correlated with performance should
be included in a compensation contract, seems to be violated in many
occupations”(Prendergast 1999, p. 21).
15The results directly carry over to the more general case where this need not be
true. One simply has to replace µZ,1 with µg
Z in the formulas below, where g
Z is the
plausible distribution of Z which has the lowest mean. The idea is the same as in
the proof of Proposition 1. The principal’s implementation costs when one ﬁxes the
distribution which the agent uses to evaluate the wage scheme to g
Z are weakly lower
than the actual implementation costs. When the ambiguous measure Z is used only
to a small extent, then the agent indeed uses the distribution g
Z to evaluate the wage
scheme. Therefore, when we want to determine whether or not the principal uses the
ambiguous performance measure Z we can restrict the attention to distribution g
Z.
16When the agent feels ambiguity with respect to both measures, the principal may
optimally neglect both measures; that is, set a ﬁxed wage.WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 16
Observe that the condition that the ambiguous measure is used is
stronger when there is another nonambiguous measure (this is the case
considered in this section; see Proposition 4) than when there is no other









The reason is simple. When there is another measure, the principal can
still provide incentives when she uses the other measure. This type of
substitution is not possible when there is no other measure. Because
the agent’s marginal eﬀort costs are the lowest for small incentives, it
is attractive for the principal to set at least some incentives. Therefore,
without another measure the principal is more eager to contract on the
ambiguous measure. Note that when σ2
Y → ∞, the measure Y is not
useful for the principal because the variance is huge. Then the thresholds
in (14) are the same in the limit.
The next proposition states that the principal may also not contract
on the measure Z when εY and εZ are correlated, where ρ is the correla-
tion coeﬃcient.
P ro p o s i t i o n 5: When ρ < 0, the principal contracts on the

















5.1. PRINCIPAL’S AGGREGATION PROBLEM AND THE EFFECTS OF
AN AMBIGUITY-AVERSE PRINCIPAL
We assumed that aggregating all the distributions which are plausible
for the agent yields the principal’s aggregated distribution ε ∼ N(0,σ2).
What happens when one departs from this assumption? As long as the
principal aggregates to some distribution, we can still normalize the shock
such that the principal evaluates the wage scheme according to the distri-
bution ε ∼ N(0,σ2). Then the problem does not change qualitatively, at
least when there exists a plausible normalized distribution for the agent
with a non-negative mean.WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 17
If this is not the case, so that all plausible distributions have negative
means, the principal is better oﬀ with negative than with zero incentives.
It may turn out that the optimal negative incentives lead to a higher
expected payoﬀ for the principal than the optimal positive incentives.
That is, the principal may optimally set negative incentives and Lemma
2 therefore no longer holds.17
Suppose next that also the principal is ambiguity averse and that
she has the same set of plausible priors as the agent. For small positive
incentives, the worst distribution for the principal is the one with the
highest mean, while for the agent the worst distribution is the one with
the lowest mean. Obviously, the principal’s ambiguity aversion makes
it more likely that she optimally sets no incentives at all when there is
one performance measure, or does not use an ambiguous measure when
several measures are available.
5.2. ROBUSTNESS AND ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS OF AMBIGUITY
AVERSION
The feature of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) model that the agent as-
signs to each wage scheme the lowest expected value over his set of priors
is not important for our results. Following Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and




ˆ w( )|g + (1 − α)max
g∈G
ˆ w( )|g ,
with α ∈ [0,1]. Clearly, when 1 + cµg < 0, where g ∈ argming∈G µg, and
α is suﬃciently close to 1, the principal sets no incentives when there is
one performance measure. Our results regarding multiple performance
measures are robust in the same sense.
It is crucial for our results that the ambiguity-averse agent is not
ambiguity neutral in the limit when gambles become small. When the
agent is ambiguity neutral in the limit, then making the wage scheme de-
pendent on an ambiguous performance measure has only a second-order
eﬀect on the agent’s ambiguity premium and thereby on the principal’s
implementation costs. In Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji’s (2005) con-
cept of smooth ambiguity aversion, the individual is ambiguity neutral
17Then the principal and the agent are essentially betting. The betting motive is
then so strong that it dominates the motive to implement positive eﬀort. See also
Billot et al. (2000). They show that agents with noncommon priors and preferences
` a la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) take bets when they have not at least one common
prior.WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 18
in the limit when the function φ is strictly increasing, continuous, and
diﬀerentiable.
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) weaken the indepen-
dence axiom considered by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Therefore,
they yield a generalization of their model. Because the multiple prior
model remains as a special case, we can be sure that our results also hold
in some speciﬁcations of their model. However, as the authors argue,“the
limit behavior of variational preferences is described by multiple priors
preferences, but the size of the sets of priors they feature is very diﬀer-
ent”(p. 1459). For some classes of variational preferences, this set is just
a singleton, so that the limit preference is just the subjective expected
utility preference and the individual is ambiguity neutral in the limit.18
The normal distribution, linear contract, exponential utility structure
is not very general.19 An obvious question is whether or not our results
can be expected to hold in a more general model. We have the follow-
ing conjecture. Also in a more general model it should hold that the
ambiguity-averse agent evaluates a wage scheme pessimistically. There-
fore, when the principal contracts on an ambiguous performance measure
the compensation demanded by the agent is relatively high, compared to
the orthodox model. This implies that the principal’s costs of providing
incentives are relatively high and that she yields a relatively low expected
payoﬀ. Additionally, unless the agent is ambiguity neutral in the limit,
the compensation he demands is not negligible even for small incentives.
This implies that the principal may optimally not contract on an am-
biguous performance measure.
In more abstract terms, we think that the kernel of the Ellsberg (1961)
paradox directly predicts that the principal may optimally not contract
on an ambiguous performance measure. Contracting on an ambiguous
performance measure is like contracting on an urn with unknown proba-
bilities. The principal has to provide a compensation to the agent when
contracting on an ambiguous performance measure. When there is a lot
of ambiguity, the agent demands a compensation which may be so high
that the principal optimally does not contract on the ambiguous measure.
5.3. WHEN PARTIES “AGREE TO DISAGREE”
The model stays mathematically equivalent when there is neither ambigu-
ity nor ambiguity aversion, but the agent and the principal have diﬀerent
18Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) call this second-order ambiguity
sensitivity; see especially p. 1873.
19Linear contracts are optimal in the dynamic setting of Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom
(1987). It is an open question whether this result holds with ambiguity.WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 19
opinions about the distribution of the shock. That is, both parties“agree
to disagree”. Suppose that the principal thinks that the shock is normally
distributed with variance σ2 and a (normalized) mean of 0, whereas the
agent thinks that the shock is normally distributed with variance σ2
N and
mean µ1. When the agent is more pessimistic about the distribution
than the principal we have µ1 < 0 and σ2
N > σ2. Observe hat this is just
the case we have considered before when we have ambiguity/ambiguity
aversion and the plausible distributions which can be ordered in a grid.
The agent may also be more optimistic than the principal so that we
have µ1 > 0 and σ2
N < σ2. Then the principal sets very high-powered
incentives and receives a very high perceived expected payoﬀ, compared
to the case with a common prior.
5.4. AGENT’S WELFARE
Suppose the agent is either ambiguity averse or not. Given that there is
ambiguity, when is he better oﬀ from an ex post perspective? In both
cases, the principal speciﬁes the oﬀer such that the agent’s perceived
expected utility equals the utility from his reservation payoﬀ ¯ w. However,
when the agent is ambiguity averse, the actual expected utility20 exceeds
the perceived expected utility. Hence, from an ex post perspective the
agent obtains a higher surplus with ambiguity aversion than without it.
The agent’s higher surplus is at the principal’s expense; see Proposition
2.21
Do these results also hold with multiple principals? Suppose multi-
ple principals compete perfectly for the agent. Then, in equilibrium all
principals must make zero expected proﬁts. This is true with or without
ambiguity aversion of the agent. Hence, the principals’ proﬁts do not
change due to agent’s ambiguity aversion. The expected total surplus
is E[q − w] + ˜ w, where ˜ w = t + sa − 1
2ηs2σ2 − 1
2ca2 is the actual cer-
tainty equivalent. Maximization of the expected total surplus yields that
s∗
total = 1/(1 + ηcσ2). Observe that this is the level of incentives pro-
vided when there is no ambiguity aversion. With ambiguity aversion, the
principal sets generically diﬀerent incentives. Hence, with an ambiguity-
averse agent, the expected total surplus is lower than without ambiguity
aversion. From before we know that with perfect competition the prin-
cipals’ proﬁts do not change due to agent’s ambiguity aversion. Hence,
from an ex post perspective the agent is worse oﬀ with ambiguity aversion
20To evaluate welfare, we assume that the principal’s prior is correct.
21That a party proﬁts from its distorted prior is non-standard. For example, in
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), the party with the undistorted prior exploits the
party with the distorted prior.WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 20
than without it. This result is the reverse yielded with only one principal.
Therefore, whether or not the agent is better oﬀ with ambiguity aversion
crucially depends on the competitiveness of the environment.
5.5. AMBIGUITY ABOUT PRODUCTIVITY
We have assumed that the agent’s knowledge about the shock ε is am-
biguous. What can we say when the ambiguity concerns the productivity
of eﬀort? To formalize this, suppose that the agent takes several produc-
tivity parameters βj as plausible. The agent evaluates the wage scheme
according to
q = βja + ε, (15)
where βj ∈ {β1,...,βJ}, with βj < βj+1. We assume that 0 < β1 < 1 <
βJ. Note that the principal evaluates the contract still with q = a + ε.
We look at the principal’s subproblem of determining the cost min-
imizing contract for the desired eﬀort level. Recognize that cost min-
imization is a necessary condition for the optimality of the principal’s
contract. When the principal wants to implement the eﬀort level a = 0,
then ambiguity concerning the productivity of eﬀort has no eﬀect at all.
There is, however, an eﬀect when the principal wants to implement
positive eﬀort a > 0. Then the principal has to provide positive incentives
s > 0 and the βj which leads to lowest expected payoﬀ for the agent
is β1. That is, the agent evaluates the wage scheme according to the
productivity parameter β1.
One can rewrite (15) as
q = a + ˙ εa, (16)
when one deﬁnes ˙ εa := ε − (1 − β1)a. This transformation allows us to
use the insights we have yielded in the main part of the paper. Am-
biguity concerning the productivity of eﬀort has the following eﬀect: it
negatively shifts the mean of the plausible distribution with which the
agent evaluates the wage scheme whenever a positive level of eﬀort should
be implemented. Therefore, ambiguity concerning eﬀort (i) increases the
principal’s costs of implementing any positive eﬀort level; (ii) weakly de-
creases the implemented eﬀort level; and (iii) makes it possible that the
principal does not provide any incentives at all.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We considered a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard where the
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averse to ambiguity. When the principal contracts on the ambiguous per-
formance measure the compensation demanded by the agent is relatively
high, compared to the orthodox model (without ambiguity/ambiguity
aversion). This implies that the principal’s costs of providing incentives
are relatively high and that she yields a relatively low expected payoﬀ.
Because the compensation demanded by the agent is not negligible even
for small incentives, the principal may optimally provide no incentives
at all. Moreover, the famous Informativeness Principle does not hold: it
can be optimal for the principal to ignore an informative but ambigu-
ous performance measure and instead provide incentives solely via other
measures.
Due to ambiguity the agent is pessimistic about the shock on the
performance measure. Because this comes at the costs of the principal
(via the ambiguity premium demanded by the agent) she may try to
convince the agent that there is no reason for pessimism. One way to do
this is to provide information to the agent. A problem might be that the
principal may have the opportunity to act strategically and provide only
information about the shock which indicates that high realizations are
very likely. Therefore, it may not be credible that the principal provides
information which reduce the agent’s ambiguity.
Rustichini (2005, p. 1625) shows that“[p]eople slowly adjust to ambi-
guity”because“the ambiguity premium declines as subjects repeat their
choices”. Therefore, an empirical prediction of our model is that long-
serving performance measures have a comparative advantage over new
measures. Hence, the use of performance measures should be history
dependent and long-used measures should have some persistence.
7. APPENDIX
7.1. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We prove by contradiction. We assumed that aggregating the plausible




! = 0, (17)
where pg is the probability assigned by the principal that the shock is
drawn from the plausible distribution g. When µg < 0 for all g ∈ G then P
S pgµg > 0, which cannot hold because of (17). ￿WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 22
7.2. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Suppose, in contradiction, that the principal sets negative incentives so







g/2 − ¯ w.
The agent evaluates the scheme (s,t) according to the plausible distribu-
tion






Because there exists a g for which µg ≥ 0, see Lemma 1, and σ2
g > 0 we
have
s




ˇ g/2 < 0.
Hence, the principal’s expected payoﬀ is below − ¯ w. With s = 0 it would
be − ¯ w. Hence, setting s∗ < 0 cannot be optimal. ￿
7.3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
First we prove the “if” part. Suppose that the principal solves the pro-













− ¯ w subject to s ≥ 0. (19)
Ignoring the constraint, the derivative is
d...
ds
= 1/c + µg − ηsσ
2
g − s/c.
When this derivative is non-positive at s = 0 then the principal optimally
sets s = 0 to maximize (19). This is equivalent to the condition
1 + cµg ≤ 0.
Note that for s = 0 the values of (9) and (19) are identical and that
for all s > 0 (9) is weakly higher then (19). Hence, when the principal
optimally sets s = 0 to maximize (9), then s = 0 also maximizes (19).
Therefore, s∗ = 0.
Finally we prove the “only if” part. When s → 0 then ˇ g = g because
ˇ g ∈ argmin sµg−
ηs2σ2
g
2 . Therefore, solving (9) for ˇ g = g yields that s∗ = 0
is optimal only if 1 + cµg ≤ 0. ￿WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 23
7.4. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We ﬁrst show that because of ambiguity the principal faces higher costs of
implementing any a > 0. By (10), implementing an eﬀort a > 0 requires
that s > 0. We henceforth suppose that s > 0.
































As one can see from (10), the principal’s costs are inﬂuenced by g
through the terms sµg −
ηs2σ2
g


































































By (10), the principal’s costs of implementing any eﬀort a > 0 are there-
fore higher with ambiguity than without.
We ﬁnally prove that the principal is strictly worse oﬀ due to ambi-
guity. Suppose that with ambiguity the principal optimally implements
a certain eﬀort a∗ > 0. Then by (2), s∗ = a∗c. Without ambiguity, the
principal can implement the same eﬀort with lower costs; see argumentsWEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 24
above. Therefore, the principal must be strictly better oﬀ without am-
biguity. Suppose ﬁnally that with ambiguity the principal implements
the eﬀort a∗ = 0. Without ambiguity, the principal could also implement
this eﬀort and would, because of s∗ = 0, be equally well oﬀ than with
ambiguity. But without ambiguity, she optimally implements a positive
eﬀort. The reason is that she is better oﬀ than with an eﬀort of zero.
Hence, the principal must always be better oﬀ without ambiguity. By
Lemma 2 we do not have to consider the case with s∗ < 0. ￿
7.5. PROOF OF LEMMA 3

















where pm,n is the probability assigned by the principal that the shock is
drawn from the plausible distribution [m,n],
P
S pm,n = 1, and pm,n > 0
for all m,n. We assumed that aggregating the plausible distributions













































For M = 1, the chain holds with equality. Therefore, µ1 = 0. ￿
7.6. PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 4 AND 5
Step 1. The agent’s belief about the distribution of εZ is characterized by
(µZ,m,σ2
Z,n). Simple calculations yield that the agent’s certainty equiva-
lent is
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Because an optimum exists and sy can be set freely, in the optimum
d.../dsY = 0. Hence,
sY =


























which can be rewritten as
d...
dsZ
















[ ](1 + ηcσ
2




Z,n) + (1 + ρηcσYσZ,n)
2 ≤ 0
the square bracket [ ] of (26) is non-positive.
Step 2. From (22) one can see that for ρ ≤ 0 setting sz < 0 cannot be
optimal. Prove by contradiction. Assume the contrary ˜ sZ < 0 and ˜ sY are
optimal. We must have ˜ sZ + ˜ sY > 0, otherwise sY = sZ = 0 dominates.
By setting sZ = 0 and sy = ˜ sZ + ˜ sY > 0 dominates ( ˜ sZ < 0, ˜ sY ). A
contradiction.
Step 3. What plausible distribution does the agent use to evaluate a
wage scheme? Observe that for sz → 0 sY > 0. From (21) we see thatWEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 26
for sZ ց 0 we have: µZ,m = µZ,1; for ρ > 0, σ2
Z,n = σ2
Z,N; for ρ = 0,
σ2
Z,n = σ2
Z,N; for ρ < 0, σ2
Z,n = σ2
Z,1. From (21) we see that for sZ ր 0
we have: µZ,m = µZ,M; for ρ > 0, σ2
Z,n = σ2
Z,1; for ρ = 0, σ2
Z,n = σ2
Z,N; for
ρ < 0, σ2
Z,n = σ2
Z,N.
Step 4. Case 1: ρ < 0. From Step 2 we know that sZ ≥ 0. Be-
cause the square bracket of (26) is non-positive (see Step 1), for ﬁxed
(µZ,m,σ2











otherwise sZ = 0.








otherwise sZ = 0.
Case 3: ρ > 0. Because the square bracket of (26) is non-positive (see
Step 1), for ﬁxed (µZ,m,σ2
Z,n), the principal wants to set sZ > 0 instead




> 0. Hence, with (26) and Step 3 this












Step 5. Up to now we have only used local arguments for sZ → 0.
Are these arguments globally valid? First, if the local analysis predicts
that the principal wants to set sz  = 0, then this is obviously also globally
true. Second, if the local analysis predicts the contrary, namely that in
the optimum sZ = 0, it becomes more diﬃcult. For ﬁxed (µZ,m,σ2
Z,n) we

















≥ 0. This implies that our local results
are globally valid for ﬁxed (µZ,m,σ2
Z,n). However, (µZ,m,σ2
Z,n) may change
with diﬀerent (sY,sZ). But this does not change our results: the value
of the principal’s objective function for a ﬁxed (µZ,m,σ2
Z,n) is an upper
bound for the objective function when (µZ,m,σ2
Z,n) are chosen so that (21)WEINSCHENK: MORAL HAZARD AND AMBIGUITY 27
is minimized (which is true because of ambiguity aversion). Hence, when
the principal prefers sZ = 0 for a ﬁxed (µZ,m,σ2
Z,n), she prefers sZ = 0
also when (µZ,m,σ2
Z,n) are chosen so that (21) is minimized. ￿
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